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The caption of this case on appeal contains the names of all 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(j) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Defendants agree with Plaintiffs' "Statement of the Issue" 
in this case. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In the present case, Defendants agree with Plaintiffs' 
statement of the "Standard of Review." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
In the present case, Defendants assent that the cases and 
statutes cited in Plaintiffs' "Determinative Statutes and Cases" 
are relevant and must be considered. In addition, Defendants 
incorporate two other cases which also must be heeded, Lamarr v. 
Utah State Dept. of Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
and Thimmes v. Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2001), attached hereto as Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants agree with a majority of Plaintiffs' ''Statement 
of the Case." It must be noted that Plaintiffs never directed 
and delivered their notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The bottom line in this case, is that Plaintiffs did not 
strictly comply with the statutory requirements of the Utah 
1 
Governmental Immunity Act, thus, the trial court's dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' claim was proper and required. 
In their brief, Plaintiffs do not deny that they failed to 
direct and deliver the notice of claim to the county clerk as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. In fact, Plaintiffs have 
admitted that they have only substantially complied. Rather, 
Plaintiffs have attempted to argue that although they did not 
follow the explicit language of the statutes and directed and 
delivered their notice of claim to the county clerk, it was 
eventually received by the county clerk's office, and substantial 
compliance with § 13 was sufficient. 
It is clear that the rule regarding the notice requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is that of strict 
compliance. As in this case, where § 13 of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is clear on its face as to who the notice of claim 
should be directed and delivered to, there is no need to 
interpret and manipulate legislative intent. Section 13 
specifically states that when bringing a claim against a county, 
the notice of claim must be directed and delivered to the county 
clerk. 
Plaintiffs submit that because the Kane County's retained 
counsel corresponded with them even though their notice was 
deficient, they met the overall purpose of § 63-30-13, and that 
Defendants should have been estopped from moving for dismissal, 
2 
Plaintiffs are wrong. Defendants' actions do not bring rise to 
estoppel. First, Defendants' counsel specifically stated that 
correspondence with her neither confirmed, accepted, or validated 
sufficiency of their notice. Second, Defendants never 
acknowledged or instructed Plaintiffs that the service of the 
notice of claim to the commissioners was sufficient. Third, the 
county attorney never represented that he had the authority to 
instruct, nor did he do so, or even indicate that the deliverance 
of the notice to the commission was sufficient to satisfy the 
statutory requirements. 
Further, this Court has been very explicit in declaring that 
strict compliance is the law. In fact, as recently as March, 
2001, it has been proclaimed so. Plaintiffs have only two cases 
on which they reach to rely. However, the court stated, even in 
those cases, that strict compliance is the law and that only 
because of very specific facts, did they reach what seems to be a 
more flexible holding of the law. Plaintiffs' reliance on these 
cases and facts are misplaced. 
Additionally, Defendants motion to dismiss was based on the 
fact that Plaintiffs failed to follow the statutory procedures 
which are required in order to commence a suit. Plaintiffs 
assert that further discovery should have been allowed. However, 
Plaintiffs' argument is inappropriate as Defendants moved the 
trial court to dismiss based on lack of subject matter 
3 
jurisdiction, therefore, Rule 56(f) is inappropriate. Again, the 
trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs' suit and in not 
approving additional discovery. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have argued that this Court should now 
adjust the law to make it one of "substantial compliance." 
Again, this Court has declared over and over again that strict 
compliance is the law and Plaintiffs have not offered any 
compelling reason to deviate from what has advanced justice for 
over twenty-five years. Furthermore, this is not the correct 
forum in which to seek an adjustment of the statute. Any change 
must be legislatively mandated. 
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs claims for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and this Court should affirm 
its holding. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THEY 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S 
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 explicitly state, in 
relevant part: 
§13: A claim against a political 
subdivision, or against its employee . . ., 
is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political 
subdivision according to the requirements of 
Section 63-30-11 within one year after the 
claim arises, . . . 
§ 11: (b) The notice of claim shall be: 
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(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is 
against a county; (Emphasis added). 
See Appellants' Addendum A 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that strict 
compliance of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is required. 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999), 
(see Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah 1972) (The Court stated "[w]e have consistently held that 
where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance 
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to 
maintain a suit."). 
Further, this Court has held that when interpreting a 
statute, the plain language is first examined. State v. Vigil, 
842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992), Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This Court stated that 
u
 [w]e will resort to other methods of statutory interpretation 
only if we find the language of the statutes to be ambiguous." 
Vigil, at 845. In Bellonio, regarding § 13 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, the Court of Appeals of Utah found 
they need look no further than the statute's plain language. 
Bellonio, at 1296. "The plain meaning of section 13 is that a 
claim against a political subdivision is "barred" unless notice 
is filed with the "governing body," which is enumerated in § 63-
30-11, within one year of the claim arising." Id. As recently 
as this year, courts have already declared twice, that the notice 
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provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are to be strictly 
construed and full compliance with its requirements is a 
condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit. Thimmes v. 
Utah State University, 417 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), 
Great West Casualty v. Utah Department of Transportation, 415 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).1 
Plaintiffs' Delivery Of Their Notice Was NOT Legally Sufficient. 
In their Brief, Plaintiffs' basis for this appeal is that 
the trial court was estopped from dismissing their case and was 
incorrect in doing so because their notice was eventually 
received by employees of the county clerk's office, and such 
action fulfilled the overall purpose and intent of § 63-30-13. 
Plaintiffs argument is premised on three cases, Brittain v. State 
by and through Utah Department of Employment, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), Bischel v. Merit, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), and Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1980). However, Plaintiffs' reliance on the above cases is 
misplaced and the facts are distinguishable to the facts of the 
case at hand. 
In Brittain, the court determined that where the plaintiff 
directed and delivered their notice of claim to Risk Management 
lIt must be noted that in the Great West Casualty decision, 
Judge Orme expressed frustration that any change to the state's 
"immunity scheme" cannot be resolved in this forum, and is an issue 
for the legislature, not the courts. See Appellees' Argument III 
in this Brief. 
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and the attorney general, the requirements of § 63-3 0-12 were 
satisfied. At the time of Brittain's holding, § 12 provided: 
A claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the 
claim arises. Brittain, at 669 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993) 
However the court the court in Bellonio distinguished Brittain in 
one respect, because it was a case involving § 12 rather than § 
13. Bellonio, at 1297. The case was further distinguished facts 
by reasoning that while the court found it "reasonable" to 
construe Risk Management as the "agency concerned" as set forth 
in § 12, § 13 contained no language that the city's legal counsel 
was entitled to the notice. Id. 
In Bischel, the court found a notice of claim sufficient 
where the plaintiff directed and delivered notice to the county 
attorney as opposed to the county commission. The plaintiff did 
not know who serve, so she called the commission to ask. In 
response the plaintiff was instructed to direct and deliver her 
notice to the Salt Lake County Attorney. It must be noted that 
at the time of Bischel, the notice requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act were more ambiguous than they are under 
the present code. When Bischel was decided, § 13 stated that a 
claim against a political subdivision "is barred unless notice is 
7 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within 
one year after the claim arises." Bischel, at 277 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). The court stated in its 
distinguishment, that, 
Thus, the end result in Bischel was not based 
upon a substantial compliance or constructive 
notice theory, but rather was founded upon 
the apparent agency of the commission 
employee. Bischel at 1298. 
In Stahl, the statute at issue was not even the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Rather, the issue was whether or not 
the plaintiff had fulfilled the thirty day notice as required by 
the Utah Public Transit Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-20-56. Stahl, 
at 480-81. This Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss 
because the Utah Public Transit Act did not contain an express 
bar against maintaining an action for noncompliance and found the 
plaintiff's substantial compliance sufficient. Id. at 481-82. 
This Court declared that "generally a direction in a statute to 
do an act is considered "mandatory" when consequences are 
attached to the failure to act. Id. at 481-82. Taken 
conversely, this statement means that the legislature intended to 
bar actions for noncompliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act's notice requirements.2 
2It must be noted that Stahl, a 1980 case, is neither binding 
or controlling. 
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A binding and more factually similar case is that of 
Bellonio. In Bellonio, the plaintiff argued that constructive 
notice, coupled with substantial compliance was sufficient but 
the court disagreed. Bellonio, at 1296. In the Bellonio case, 
the plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking terrace at the Salt 
Lake Airport on June 14, 1992. Bellonio's first attorney 
informed the insurance carrier that he was plaintiff's counsel, 
this information was forwarded to Robert M. Kern, the airport's 
legal counsel. Mr. Kern instructed that any further 
correspondence should come to his office. Id. at 1295. 
Bellonio retained a second attorney who engaged in a number 
of correspondences between the plaintiff and Mr. Kern, and then 
on March 24, 1993, directed and delivered a notice of claim to 
Mr. Kern. Mr. Kern acknowledged receipt and indicated that he 
was awaiting further reports. On July 11, Bellonio directed and 
delivered his notice of claim to the Utah Attorney General, the 
Salt Lake City Attorney, and the Airport Director, but not upon 
Salt Lake City's Mayor or the Salt Lake City Council. Id. 
On June 14, 1993, Bellonio's third attorney filed a 
complaint against Salt Lake City and the Airport. The trial 
court dismissed Bellonio's claim against the airport but not 
against Salt Lake City. The City brought an interlocutory appeal 
seeking dismissal because Bellonio failed to strictly comply with 
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the notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Id. 
As in this case, Bellonio attempted to rely on Brittain and 
Bischel and argued that since Mr. Kern had told him to direct all 
correspondence to him, that dismissal would be inappropriate. 
However the court relied on the fact that while the airport's 
attorney did request that all communication be sent to him, he 
never indicated that he was the proper agent to receive the 
notice of claim. The court further held that Bischel was not 
persuasive because Mr. Kern was never the agent of the mayor of 
the city or the council. Regarding Bellonio's reliance on 
Brittain and Bischel, the court declared that: 
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a 
flexible rule of constructive notice to 
governmental entities, this is not the 
general rule in this state. Bellonio, at 1297 
(emphasis added). 
Further, the court set forth: 
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is 
limited by their unique factual underpinnings 
and therefore, neither should be construed as 
an indication that we are prepared to 
abrogate the longstanding rule requiring 
strict compliance with all aspects of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
The court also noted that Bellonio "never even attempted to 
direct his notice of claim to the proper party, i.e., the mayor 
of the city council." Bellonio, at 1298. In their holding, the 
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court found that Bellonio's claim was barred since he did not 
file the required notice of claim set forth in § 63-30-13. 
In the instant case, the explicit language of §§ 63-30-11 
and 63-30-13 state that the notice of claim must be directed and 
delivered to the county clerk when a county is being sued. See 
Appellants' Brief, Addendum A. In correspondences dated February 
11, 1999, Plaintiffs directed and delivered their notice of claim 
to the Kane County Commissioners: Stephen R. Crosby, Joe C. Judd, 
and Norman Carroll. See Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, Addendum C. 
Plaintiffs never directed and delivered or even attempted to 
direct and deliver a notice of claim to the Kane County Clerk, 
nor do they dispute that they did so. Also, Defendants never 
instructed or even indicated to the Plaintiffs that the Kane 
County Commission was the proper agent to receive their notice of 
claim. Further, Plaintiffs never inquired if their notice was 
sufficient. Moreover, a letter from Linette Hutton, Defendants' 
counsel, dated March 8, 1999, was exact in stating that their 
receipt of the notice of claim did not accept, deny, confirm or 
verify sufficiency of the claim. See Plaintiffs' Brief, Addendum 
D. In light of this language, it is incredulous to contend that 
Ms. Hutton represented herself or the commission as Kane County's 
agent for purposes of the notice requirements. 
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Thus, the trial court was correct in finding that Plaintiffs 
did not comply with the statutory notice requirements, which 
resulted in the proper dismissal of their claim. 
The County Attorney Did Not Have The Authority To Confirm The 
Person To Possess And Act Upon The Notice of Claim. 
Plaintiffs argue further that Kane County Attorney, Colin 
Winchester's correspondence confirmed Kane County's legal 
counsel, Linette B. Hutton as who should possess and act upon the 
notice. 
Again, Plaintiffs' erroneously rely on Bischel, and point to 
a March 20, 1999 letter from Mr. Winchester which stated in 
relevant part that "Kane County has turned the claim over to its 
claim adjustors, who have in turn retained Linette B. Hutton. 
Please direct all further correspondence to Ms. Hutton," See 
Appellants' Brief, Addendum E. 
In light of the language in Ms. Hutton's letter as well as 
the decision on this exact issue in Bellonio3, , it was not 
3In Bellonio, plaintiff's claims against Salt Lake City were 
dismissed because he filed a notice of claim with the airport's 
attorney. Prior to filing any notice, Plaintiff was instructed to 
address all correspondence to the airport's attorney. Based on 
these facts, the plaintiff argued that his reliance and substantial 
compliance was sufficient. The Court of Appeals disagreed and 
stated [w]hile it is clear that [the airport's attorney] did make 
such a request, he never indicated, either expressly or impliedly, 
that he was the proper agent to receive the statuory notice of 
claim, nor did [plainitff] request from him any information 
regarding Governmental Immunity Act Compliance. Bellonio, at 1298. 
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reasonable for Plaintiffs to believe Mr. Winchester's instruction 
to address all further correspondence to Ms. Hutton made their 
notice sufficient and effective. As argued above, neither Ms. 
Hutton or Mr. Winchester represented that notice was sufficient. 
In fact, Ms. Hutton went one step further than the airport's 
attorney in Bellonio, and declared in her letter that 
correspondence with her did not validate sufficiency of notice. 
Further, it must be noted that even though Plaintiffs tout that 
they believed Mr. Winchester and Ms. Hutton to have had authority 
to act on behalf of Kane County, Plaintiffs never attempted to 
direct and deliver a notice of claim to either of them. 
All Plaintiffs' reasoning and argument does not obviate the 
fact that they did not comply with the notice requirements. For 
these reasons, the trial court's decision must be affirmed. 
II. IT WAS PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFFS' 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY SINCE THE CLAIM WAS 
DISMISSED DUE TO THE COURT'S LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
In their brief, Plaintiffs state that "when matters outside 
the pleadings under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
are considered, the motion is properly treated as one for summary 
judgment under rule 56." See Appellants' Brief at p. 19. In 
this case, the court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss based 
on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, therefore, Rule 56(f) 
is inapplicable. See R. at 165-167. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly held that the 
statutory notice requirement is " a jurisdictional requirement 
and a precondition to suit." Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of 
Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988). In Lamarr, the court 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and found the 
agency immune as per the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff argued that the notice issue 
was not properly before the court because the notice issue was an 
affirmative defense and not properly pleaded in defendant's 
answer. Lamarr, at 540. Plaintiff argued further that since the 
defendant did not ask the court to rule on the notice issue in 
their summary judgment motion, the court could not rule on it. 
Id. The court declared that the plaintiff's argument 
"misconstrues the nature of the statutory notice of claim 
requirement." Id. The court in Lamarr announced that it was 
required to dismiss the claim against the defendant because it 
lacked jurisdiction. Id. 
In the present case, while Defendants did provide an 
affidavit in support of their Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs have 
misrepresented the law regarding this motion. Therefore, Rule 
56(f) is inapplicable to the present case. Here, Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss was not based on grounds that Plaintiff did not 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants moved 
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the court to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim based on lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). R. 20-29. Since 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for treatment of 
Rule (b)(1) motions as motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs' 
appeal on this issue is inappropriate. 
Likewise, the trial court relied upon sufficient evidence to 
determine that the Plaintiffs did not satisfy the notice 
requirement as set forth in § 13. Plaintiffs do not dispute that 
they failed to direct and deliver their notice of claim to the 
Kane County Clerk. Moreover, Plaintiffs have been in full 
possession of all correspondence between themselves and Kane 
County, and any further information was and is irrelevant as to 
whether they fulfilled the statutory requirements of § 13. 
Because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for 
treatment of Rule 12(b)(1) motions as motions for summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs attempt to color the dismissal for other 
reasons than jurisdictional to invoke Rule 56(f) discovery 
procedures is inappropriate. The trial court was required to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' claims and did so appropriately without 
allowing further discovery. 
III. STRICT COMPLIANCE IS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
In Plaintiffs' last issue on appeal, they contend that this 
Court should now overturn the long standing law of strict 
compliance and find substantial compliance adequate. The 
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gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is that when the purpose and 
intent of the statute are met, regardless of how or who the 
notice of claim is directed and delivered to, then notice should 
be effective. 
The landmark case of Scarborough, this Court explicitly 
stated that: 
The purpose of statutes requiring the 
presentation of claims to political 
subdivisions prior to filing a suit is in 
furtherance of public policy to prevent 
unnecessary litigation. The purpose of the 
notice provisions is to afford the political 
subdivision an opportunity to investigate the 
claim while the matter is of recent memory, 
witnesses are yet available, conditions have 
not been materially changed and to determine 
if there is liability, and if there is the 
extent of it. 
Additionally, in a most recent decision dealing with § 13, the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Great West Casualty recognized that the 
judicial forum is not the place to adjust the strict compliance 
rule and refused to do so. The court stated: 
[s]uch an adjustment in the philosophy 
underlying our State's sovereign immunity 
scheme must, however, come at the hands of 
the Legislature and not this Court. Great 
West Casualty, at 27-28. 
Further, even more recently than Great West Casualty, the Utah 
Court of Appeals announced again in Thimmes that strict 
compliance is the rule. In Thimmes, the plaintiff was not sure 
who to direct and deliver her notice to, so she called an unknown 
individual at the Utah Attorney General's Office. Plaintiff 
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contends that someone, although she could not say who, instructed 
her to direct and deliver her notice of claim to Risk Management. 
Id. Thimmes argued that Bischel applied and because she was 
instructed by a state agent to direct and deliver her notice of 
claim to Risk Management. However, the court found that the 
u[a]ppellant ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to justify 
her reliance on the advice of an unnamed state employee rather 
than the plain language of section 63-30-12." Id. The court 
noted their decision in Bellonio and indicated that u[w]e pointed 
to the unique factual circumstances of Bischel and said our 
decision in that case should not be viewed as an "abrogat[ion of] 
the long-standing rule requiring strict compliance with all 
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act." Id. (citing Bellonio, 
at 1297)(emphasis added). 
For over twenty-five years, from Scarborough in 1975 to 
Great West Casualty and Thimmes in 2 0 01, the courts have 
recognized and respected a rule of strict compliance of all 
aspects of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, specifically the 
notice requirements. The Immunity Act has evolved from a 
substandard substantial compliance rule to a more effective, 
strict compliance standard, which has become a rule affording and 
promoting justice and equity as § 63-30-13 explicitly sets forth 
requirements and the consequences for failure to follow them. As 
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stated above, in decisions that seem to make the rule more 
flexible, it has been declared that: 
[w]hile . . . it may seem to indicate a 
flexible rule of constructive notice to 
governmental entities, this is not the 
general rule in this state. Bellonio, at 12 97 
(emphasis added). 
Further, the court set forth: 
[T]he precedential effect of [these] cases is 
limited by their unique factual underpinnings 
and therefore, neither should be construed as 
an indication that we are prepared to 
abrogate the longstanding rule requiring 
strict compliance with all aspects of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Strict compliance has been declared the law in order to make 
sure that the proper entities know that they are being sued and 
so they are able to prepare for litigation. If the courts had to 
determine in each and every case whether notice requirements had 
been substantially complied with, our already limited judicial 
resources would be wasted. 
In this case, Plaintiffs have admitted that they have only 
substantially complied with required notice requirements, so now 
in a last ditch effort they are reaching to this Court to 
overturn a well defined mandated rule to reach sufficiency in 
order to reverse the trial courts decision and remand the issue 
for trial. For the foregoing reasons and since this Court is not 
the proper forum in which to adjust the strict compliance rule, 
18 
the strict compliance standard must be upheld making anything 
less deficient. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiffs admittedly did not strictly comply with 
the requirements set forth in § 63-30-13 and direct and deliver 
their notice of claim with the Kane County Clerk within the one 
year statutory time period, the trial court had to dismiss 
Plaintiffs claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For 
the foregoing reasons, the trial court was correct in dismissing 
Plaintiffs' claims and its decision must me upheld. 
DATED on this JJP day of April, 2001. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
PETER STIRBA ^ ^ 
AIMEE K. MARTINEZ 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nicholas LAMARR, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, and Salt Lake City, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 910600-CA. 
March 26, 1992. 
Pedestrian who was struck while walking across 
overpass brought action against city and Department 
of Transportation. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., granted 
defendants' motions for summary judgment and 
pedestrian appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
Associate P.J., held that: (1) Sidewalk Construction 
Act did not require city to maintain sidewalk along 
overpass which was a state road on which state had 
placed pedestrian walkway; (2) city owed no special 
duty to pedestrian to control transients who allegedly 
prevented him from using the pedestrian walkway; 
and (3) pedestrian was required to serve notice of 
claim on both Department of Transportation and the 
Attorney General. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Courts <®^99(3) 
106 — 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case as Law 
of the Case 
106k99(3) Jurisdiction, Dismissal, Nonsuit, and 
Summary Judgment, Rulings Relating To. 
Trial court's earlier denial of defendant's motion for 
summary judgment did not preclude the court from 
revisiting the issue and later granting summary 
judgment. 
[2] Negligence <®^202 
272 ---
2721 In General 
272k202 Elements in General. 
(Formerly 272kl) 
Four elements which plaintiff must establish to state 
claim of negligence are that defendant owed plaintiff 
a duty, that defendant breached the duty, that the 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 
breach of the duty was the proximate cause of 
plaintiffs injury, and that there was injury. 
[3] Highways <&* 198 
200 — 
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel 
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions 
200k 198 Liabilities of Local Authorities and 
Officers. 
Provision of the Sidewalk Construction Act allowing 
city to use certain funds for construction of curbs, 
gutters, sidewalks, and pedestrian safety devices did 
not impose mandatory duty on city to construct 
sidewalk on overpass, which was a state road and 
already had a state-maintained pedestrian walkway. 
U.C.A. 1953, 27-14-2. 
[4] Highways <®^ 198 
200 — 
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel 
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions 
200kl98 Liabilities of Local Authorities and 
Officers. 
Sidewalk Construction Act does not place mandatory 
duty on city to supplement state's efforts to insure 
pedestrian's safety on state roads. U.C.A.1953, 
27-14-2. 
[5] Municipal Corporations <®^766 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets and 
Other Public Ways 
268k765 Nature of Defects 
268k766 In General. 
Under the public duty doctrine, city owed no duty to 
pedestrian to control transients who gathered at 
stairway to pedestrian walkway along overpass, and 
pedestrian could not recover for injuries which he 
sustained when he chose to walk on the overpass 
rather than the pedestrian walkway in order to avoid 
harassment and possible physical violence by 
transients. 
[6] Municipal Corporations <®^723 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k723 Nature and Grounds of Liability. 
Public duty doctrine applies even where 
governmental immunity has been specifically waived 
by statute. 
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[7] Municipal Corporations <®^723 
268 — 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k723 Nature and Grounds of Liability. 
Public duty doctrine is a creature of the common 
law and legislature could abrogate that common-law 
doctrine if it chose to do so in specific terms. 
[8] Municipal Corporations <@ =^>741.20 
268 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims for 
Injury 
268k741.20 Requirement as Mandatory or 
Condition Precedent. 
(Formerly 268k741.1(3)) 
[See headnote text below] 
[8] Municipal Corporations <®^:>742(4) 
268 
268X11 Torts 
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and 
Corporate Powers in General 
268k742 Actions 
268k742(4) Pleading. 
Statutory notice of claim is a jurisdictional 
requirement and a precondition to suit; it is not an 
affirmative defense which must be pled. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 8(c). 
[9] Courts <®^37(2) 
106 — 
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in 
General 
106k37 Waiver of Objections 
106k37(2) Time of Making Objection. 
[See headnote text below] 
[9] Courts <®^39 
106 — 
1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in 
General 
106k39 Determination of Questions of Jurisdiction 
in General. 
Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any 
party or the court. 
[10] Statutes <®^223.4 
361 — 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k223 Construction with Reference to Other 
Statutes 
361k223.4 General and Special Statutes. 
When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, 
the more specific provision governs over the more 
general provision. 
[11] Highways <§^203 
200 — 
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel 
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions 
200k201 Actions for Injuries 
200k203 Notice of Claim for Injury. 
Statutory requirement that person suing Department 
of Transportation serve notice of claim on UDOT and 
the Attorney General prevails over rule of civil 
procedure allowing service on the agency. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(ll); U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12. 
[12] Highways <®^203 
200 — 
200IX Regulation and Use for Travel 
200IX(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions 
200k201 Actions for Injuries 
200k203 Notice of Claim for Injury. 
Claimant did not effectively comply with statute 
governing service of notice of claim by serving only 
the Department of Transportation and not the 
Attorney General. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12. 
[13] States <®=» 197 
360 — 
360VI Actions 
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action Against 
State 
360kl97 Presentation of Claim. 
One-year period for filing notice of claim against 
state is tolled for the duration of any legally 
recognized disability. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12, 
78-12-36. 
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and RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiff Nicholas Lamarr (Lamarr) appeals from a 
summary judgment dismissing his negligence claims 
against the Utah State Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) and Salt Lake City (the City) arising out of 
an accident on the North Temple overpass. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
On April 18, 1987, at approximately 10:30 p.m., 
Lamarr was struck by a car while walking east across 
the North Temple overpass. The impact threw 
Lamarr over the side of the overpass, and Lamarr 
struck the ground, suffering serious, permanent 
injuries. 
Before the accident, Lamarr had walked west across 
the overpass using the pedestrian walkway that 
deposits pedestrians under the overpass. Lamarr was 
frightened and harassed by transients who had 
congregated under the overpass. On his return trip, 
Lamarr walked along the overpass's roadway. 
Lamarr claims this was necessary to avoid harassment 
and possible *537 physical violence by the transients 
congregated around the stairway leading to the 
walkway. While walking along the roadway, an 
automobile struck Lamarr throwing him over the side 
of the overpass. 
Lamarr brought suit against UDOT and the City. 
Lamarr contends UDOT and the City were negligent 
in failing to properly construct, maintain, and place 
signs on the overpass. Lamarr also contends the City 
negligently failed to properly "control" (FN1) the 
transient population under the overpass. After 
discovery, the City and UDOT moved for summary 
judgment on a number of alternative grounds. The 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both 
UDOT and the City. 
Lamarr presents four issues on appeal: (1) did the 
trial court err in holding the City owed Lamarr no 
duty for construction, maintenance, or placing signs 
on the overpass?; (2) did the trial court err in holding 
the City owed Lamarr no private duty to control the 
transient population?; (3) did the trial court err in 
ruling as a matter of law the City and UDOT did not 
proximately cause Lamarr's injuries?; and (4) did 
the trial court err in concluding any duty of the City 
to control the transient population is an immune 
discretionary function, under Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(l)(a) (1989)? UDOT presents two 
additional issues on appeal: (1) did Lamarr's failure 
to file a notice of his claim with both UDOT and the 
attorney general deprive the trial court of jurisdiction 
over Lamarr's claims against UDOT?, and (2) did 
UDOT owe Lamarr a duty of care? 
Summary judgment is proper when the record 
indicates that "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Kitchen v. Cal Gas 
Co., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991). We 
review the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
under a "correctness" standard. Id. Thus, we accord 
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions 
underlying its grant of summary judgment. Id. 
We first consider whether summary judgment in 
favor of the City was proper, and then turn to the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of UDOT. 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE CITY 
[1] Lamarr raises multiple claims of error. Because 
of our resolution of the duty issue, however, we need 
not reach the other issues briefed on appeal. (FN2) 
A. Duty Generally 
[2] In Utah, a plaintiff must establish four elements 
to state a claim of negligence: the defendant owed 
the plaintiff a duty, defendant breached the duty 
(negligence), the breach of the duty was the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and there was in 
fact injury. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 
(Utah 1991). Establishing the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty of care is "[a]n essential element of a 
negligence claim." Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 
1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). In fact, the Utah Supreme 
Court recently noted that without a showing of duty, a 
plaintiff cannot *538 recover. Rollins v. Petersen, 
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). "Duty is 'a 
question of whether the defendant is under any 
obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff....' " 
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 30, at 356-57 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 
1984)). Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty of care is "entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the court." Id. 
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B. Duty to Maintain Safe Overpass 
[3] Lamarr first claims the City owed him a duty to 
maintain a sidewalk on the overpass or to place on the 
overpass signs that would have prevented him from 
walking on the roadway. Lamarr contends this duty 
inheres from the Utah Sidewalk Construction Act, 
which provides: 
The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks 
and pedestrian safety devices are essential to the 
general welfare of the citizens of the state. It is the 
opinion of the legislature that existing sidewalks 
within the state, especially in the most populated 
areas, are not adequate to service the walking public 
with a result of creating unnecessary hazards to 
pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-2 (1989). Section 27-14-2 
further states: "It is the intent of this act to provide a 
means whereby a portion of the funds received by the 
counties and participating cities as B and C road 
funds may be used for the construction of curbs, 
gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices 
pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act." Id. 
(emphasis added). Lamarr argues this statute imposes 
a mandatory duty on the City to construct a sidewalk 
on the overpass, even though Lamarr admits the 
overpass is a state road and already has a state-
maintained pedestrian walkway. We disagree. 
In construing statutes, we are bound to "assume that 
each term of a statute was used advisedly; and that 
each should be given an interpretation and application 
in accord with their [sic] usually accepted meaning, 
unless the context otherwise requires." Grant v. Utah 
State Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035, 
1036 (1971). In Grant, the court construed a 
forfeiture statute providing that the State Land Board 
" 'may reinstate' " a previously forfeited land sales 
contract. Id., 485 P.2d at 1036 (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 65-1-47 (1953)). The plaintiff contended 
section 65-1-47 "vest[ed] in him the absolute right to 
reinstate a forfeited certificate." Id. The court 
disagreed, holding the word "may" is not mandatory 
but only permissive. Id. 
[4] Based on the plain meaning of the statute, we 
hold the Utah Sidewalk Construction Act does not 
place a mandatory duty on the City to supplement the 
State's efforts to ensure pedestrian safety on state 
roads. Thus, the City had no duty to maintain or 
construct a sidewalk on the overpass or to place signs 
on the overpass that would have prevented Lamarr 
from walking across the roadway. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in granting the City summary 
judgment on this duty issue. (FN3) 
C. Public Duty Doctrine 
[5] Lamarr also claims the City owed him a duty to 
"control" the transient population beneath the 
overpass. The trial court held the City did not owe 
Lamarr such a duty. We agree with the trial court, 
and hold that under the public duty doctrine, the City 
owed no duty to Lamarr to "control" transients. 
Under the public duty doctrine, 
[f]or a governmental agency and its agents to be 
liable for negligently caused injury suffered by a 
member of the public, *539 the plaintiff must show 
a breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not 
merely the breach of an obligation owed to the 
general public at large by the governmental official. 
Feme, 784 P.2d at 151 (citing Obray v. Malmberg, 
26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971)). The 
public duty doctrine has been defined as "a duty to all 
is a duty to none." Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1165 
(Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Thus, if the City owed no duty to Lamarr apart 
from its duty to the general public, Lamarr cannot 
recover. See Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained the 
parameters of Utah's public duty doctrine. See id. 
In Ferree, the court applied the public duty doctrine 
holding state corrections officials were not liable 
when a prison inmate on weekend release murdered 
Dean Ferree. Id. at 151-52. The court concluded 
the officials had only a general duty to the public, not 
a private duty to Ferree, and therefore owed Ferree 
no duty of care. Id. Moreover, in Rollins, 813 P.2d 
1156, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment because under the public duty 
doctrine, the State did not owe a duty to protect the 
decedent from a state hospital patient. Id. at 1161-62. 
The court specifically noted the decedent "was simply 
a member of the public, no more distinguishable to 
the hospital than to any other person." Id. at 1162. 
[6] [7] Lamarr contends "[t]he public duty doctrine 
has no application where governmental immunity has 
specifically been waived by statute." The Utah 
Supreme Court has clearly rejected Lamarr's theory. 
(FN4) The specific question of the effect of waiver 
of immunity on the public duty doctrine was 
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addressed in Feme. In rejecting a claim similar to 
Lamarr's, the court stated: 
Sovereign immunity, however, is an affirmative 
defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the 
question of whether there is tort liability in the first 
instance. There is sound reason and desirable 
simplicity in analyzing and applying negligence 
concepts before deciding issues of sovereign 
immunity.... 
"... Conceptually, the question of the applicability 
of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is 
determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty 
of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in 
the absence of such immunity." 
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 152-53 (quoting Davidson v. 
City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-02, 649 P.2d 
894, 896, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 254 (1982)). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently affirmed its 
decision and reasoning in Ferree. In Rollins, 813 
P.2d 1156, the estate of a decedent killed in an 
accident with a stolen automobile driven by a state 
hospital patient brought a wrongful death action 
against, among others, the State. Id. at 1158. The 
trial court granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment concluding the State had no duty to the 
decedent other than its duty to the general public. Id. 
On appeal, the court again addressed the question of 
whether the legislature's abrogation of immunity 
abolished the public duty doctrine. Once again 
answering this question in the negative, the court 
explained: 
[T]he legislature's abrogation of absolute sovereign 
immunity does not lead to the conclusion that the 
public duty doctrine has also been abrogated. 
Legislative recognition of a right to recover from 
one who has previously been immune from liability 
for tortious acts cannot logically be read as an 
elimination of the requirement that before one can 
recover damages from another, a tort must be 
proven. There must still be *540 proof of a duty 
owed to the one claiming injury and a breach of that 
duty. 
Therefore, in the present case, as in any tort case, 
the proper mode of analysis is to first consider 
whether there is a legal theory upon which suit can 
be brought ... before considering the separate and 
independent question of whether the [governmental 
agency] is immune. 
Id. at 1162 n. 3 (emphasis added); see also Kirk v. 
State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah App. 1989) (to 
reach immunity issue, court must assume duty and 
negligence). 
Based on the preceding authority, Lamarr must 
establish the City owed him a "special duty." See 
Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151. We conclude Lamarr has 
failed to establish the City owed him any duty of care 
beyond that owed the general public. There is no 
evidence in the record the City had any reason to 
distinguish Lamarr from the general public. Like the 
decedent in Rollins, Lamarr "had not set himself 
apart" from the general public such that any special 
duty arose between himself and the City. In fact, 
there is no evidence the City had any knowledge 
whatsoever of either of Lamarr's trips across the 
overpass. (FN5) 
In summary, we hold the City owed Lamarr no duty 
of care. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of the City. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR UDOT 
UDOT moved for summary judgment on grounds 
Lamarr failed to file notice of his claim within one 
year with both UDOT and the Utah Attorney General 
as required by the waiver provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-12 (1989). Although the issue was fully 
briefed, the trial court did not reach the notice issue. 
Rather, the trial court ruled in favor of UDOT on its 
proximate cause claim. On appeal, UDOT asserts 
these alternative grounds upon which we can affirm 
the trial court's summary judgment: absence of 
proper notice, proximate cause, or duty of care owed 
to Lamarr. Because of our resolution of the threshold 
notice issue, we do not reach the proximate cause and 
duty issues. 
A. Notice of Claim is Jurisdictional 
[8] Lamarr first claims the notice issue is not 
properly before this court. Lamarr asserts the notice 
issue is an affirmative defense that was not pleaded in 
the answer, and thus Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure precludes UDOT from raising it in its 
summary judgment motion and on appeal. Lamarr 
notes UDOT never mentions the term "notice of 
claim" in its answer. He further argues UDOT did 
not request the court to rule on this issue on summary 
judgment and therefore we cannot consider it on 
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appeal. Lamarr's argument, however, misconstrues 
the nature of the statutory notice of claim 
requirement. Lamarr erroneously asserts the notice 
of claim provision is a statute of limitation. Rather, 
the supreme court has held the statutory notice 
requirement is a jurisdictional requirement and a 
precondition to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988). 
[9] Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by 
any party or the court. Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. 
Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). Therefore, 
Lamarr's contention that the notice issue is not 
properly before this court fails. In fact, Rule 12(h)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires this 
court to dismiss the claim against UDOT if the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction. 
B. Notice of Claim Under Section 63-30-12 
[10][11] First, Lamarr claims Rule 4(e)(ll) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows him to effect 
notice by serving only UDOT, and not the attorney 
general. *541 Section 63-30-12, however, is more 
specific than Rule 4 in that the former requires notice 
on UDOT and the attorney general. When two 
statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more 
specific provision governs over the more general 
provision. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 
681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984). Thus, section 
63-30-12 is the applicable rule at issue, not Rule 4. 
To invoke the trial court's jurisdiction over UDOT, 
Lamarr was required to comply with section 63-30-12 
, the more specific jurisdictional rule. 
Next, Lamarr argues he has "effectively" complied 
"with section 63-30-12 by serving notice only on 
UDOT. Lamarr points out the attorney general's 
office had actual notice of Lamarr's claims within the 
one-year period. Thus, Lamarr argues the intent of 
the statute was satisfied. 
[12] In construing section 60-30-12, the supreme 
court has stated: "Section 63-30-12 provides that an 
action against the State is barred if the required notice 
is not filed. It therefore makgs^tee^Q^ive notice 
grounds for dismissal. A (plain readin^^yiiost 
sections indicates that no suit against me statemay be 
maintained if notice is not given." Madsen, 769 P.2d 
at 249 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The 
importance of Madsen for Lamarr's case is the 
supreme court's application of "[a] plain reading" of 
section 60-30-12. Id. The plain language of section 
60-30-12 requires notice both to the attorney general 
and UDOT, and Lamarr admits he never filed notice 
with the attorney general. (FN6) 
[13] Moreover, the supreme court has indicated that 
actual notice cannot cure a failure to comply with the 
nptiepTJmvisieSS^t the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In (Varoz v. SeveyX29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 
(19<^L1_Jhej^pHield a plaintiff's minority did not 
excuse failure to comply with a statute requiring 
timely notice of a claim against a county. Id., 506 
P.2d at 436. (FN7) Significantly for the present 
case, the supreme court held that the county's actual 
notice of the claim did not satisfy the statute: 
[f]rom the language of the statute it is quite clear 
that the legislature intended to make the filing of a 
timely notice of claim prerequisite to maintaining an 
action. 
Actual knowledge of the circumstances which 
resulted in the death of the plaintiff's mother by 
officials of the county does not dispense with the 
necessity of filing a timely claim. 
*542. Id. (FN8) 
Requiring written notice to both UDOT and the 
attorney general is consistent with cases interpreting 
notice statutes similar to section 60-30-12. For 
example, Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 
P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), involved a companion statute 
to section 63-30-12, section 63-30-13. Section 
63-30-13 is identical to section 63-30-12 except that 
the former applies to political subdivisions, whereas 
the latter applies to state agencies. In Scarborough, 
the trial court dismissed a complaint against Granite 
School District because the plaintiff had not filed 
notice with the school district and the attorney 
general. Id. at 481. The supreme court, affirming 
the dismissal, explained: 
The School District is a political subdivision of the 
state. Therefore it would normally be immune from 
suit; and the right to sue is an exception created by 
statute. We have consistently held that where a 
cause of action is based upon a statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is a condition 
precedent to the right to maintain a suit. 
Id. at 482 (footnotes omitted). 
Applying a plain reading, we hold section 63-30-12 
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required Lamarr to serve written notice of his claim 
on both UDOT and the attorney general within one 
year of his injuries. Lamarr failed to serve the 
attorney general within the specified time, thus 
depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over Lamarr's 
claims against UDOT. Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court's dismissal of Lamarr's claims against 
UDOT. 
III. CONCLUSION 
We hold the trial court did not err in concluding as a 
matter of law that the City owed Lamarr no duty of 
care. Further, we hold Lamarr's failure to comply 
with the notice provision of the Governmental 
Immunity Act deprived the trial court of jurisdiction 
over Lamarr's claims against UDOT. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, the judgment 
of the trial court is affirmed. 
JACKSON and RUSSON, JL, concur. 
(FN1.) Although we find Lamarr's use of the term 
"control" in reference to the City's transient 
population troublesome, to directly address 
Lamarr's claims we repeat that term here. 
(FN2.) Lamarr also argues the trial court improperly 
reconsidered the question of the City's duty to 
Lamarr. Lamarr correctly notes the trial court 
denied the City's first motion for summary judgment 
asserting the City owed Lamarr no duty of care. 
The trial court granted summary judgment only after 
the City made a second motion for summary 
judgment. Lamarr claims the trial court's earlier 
denial of the City's first motion for summary 
judgment precluded the trial court from revisiting 
the duty issue. 
Lamarr ignores the well-established rule that " 
'[a]ny judge is free to change his or her mind on the 
outcome of a case until a decision is formally 
rendered.' " Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah 
App. 1988) (quoting Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 
757, 760 (Utah 1985)). "[A] trial court is not 
inexorably bound by its own precedents...." Id. 
The trial court is free to reconsider its earlier 
decision, especially when, as here, a party supports 
a second motion for summary judgment with 
additional evidence. This rule has particular 
application in cases that, like this one, involve 
multiple parties and multiple claims. Id. at 44 n. 5. 
Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in 
considering the City's second motion for summary 
judgment. 
(FN3.) We emphasize our resolution of the duty 
issue is fact specific. There is no dispute the 
overpass is a state highway. Thus, any duty of the 
City to maintain that highway must be a statutory 
duty, and our analysis focuses on that issue. Our 
resolution of this issue in no way addresses the 
existence or scope of the City's duty to safely 
maintain its streets. 
Because we hold the City had no duty to construct 
or place signs on the overpass, we need not reach 
the issue of whether that duty is a public or private 
duty under the public duty doctrine. 
(FN4.) The public duty doctrine is a creature of the 
common law. Lamarr basically argues the 
legislature abrogated the common law doctrine in 
enacting the Governmental Immunity Act. Although 
the supreme court in Ferree and Rollins expressly 
rejects this argument, we note the legislature could 
abrogate that common law doctrine if it chose to do 
so in specific terms. Cf. Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 
P.2d «, 12 (Utah 1991) (legislature has last word 
with respect to tort law). 
*542__ (FN5.) This conclusion is also supported by 
the supreme court's decision in Little v. Utah State 
Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1983). In that case, the court held that once a State 
agency took custody of an autistic child and placed 
the child in a foster home, the agency assumed a 
duty of due care to the child. Id. at 51. It was only 
after the agency had knowledge of the child's 
condition and assumed custody of the child, 
however, that the special relationship arose between 
the agency and child. Id. 
(FN6.) Recently, in Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 
785 F.Supp. 1445 (D.Utah 1990) (Memorandum 
Decision and Order), Judge Green of the United 
States Court for the District of Utah interpreted 
section 63-30-12 to require notice to both the 
attorney general and the agency. A party brought 
several claims, including state law claims, against 
the University of Utah. That party, however, failed 
to comply with section 63-30-12 and gave notice 
only to the attorney general and not to the 
University of Utah. The University of Utah claimed 
the party's failure to comply with section 63-30-12 
by giving both the University and attorney general 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
828 P.2d 535, Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., (Utah App. 1992) Page 8 
notice deprived the court of jurisdiction. Judge 
Green ruled: 
The court agrees with the defendants that the plain 
meaning of section 63-30-12 requires that two 
notices of claim should have been filed by plaintiff: 
one to the Attorney General and one to the 
University of Utah. Although this statutory 
requirement may result in redundant notice being 
given, such redundancy apparently is mandated by 
the statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney General is 
the agent and legal counsel for all state agencies, 
including the University of Utah. In this pendant 
state law claim, the court is unwilling to ignore the 
unambiguous language of the Utah statute requiring 
two separate notices, especially where the Utah 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that strict 
compliance with the notice of claim provision is 
essential to maintain a suit pursuant to the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Id. at 1446-47. 
(FN7.) We note Varoz was impliedly overruled by 
the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992) 
(enacted in 1975 and amended in 1987). That 
section provides "the time of [a] disability is not a 
part of the time limited for the commencement of 
the action." Id. In Scott v. School Board of Granite 
School District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the court 
held this section applies to the notice provisions of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 748. Thus, 
the one-year period for filing notice under section 
63-30-12 is tolled for the duration of any legally 
recognized disability. Section 78-12-36, as 
interpreted by Scott, however, provides Lamarr no 
support as he has not relied on that section and does 
not claim a disability prevented him from filing 
notice with the attorney general. 
(FN8.) See also Edwards v. Iron County ex rel. 
Valley View Medical Ctr.y 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 
1975) (even if county employees had actual 
knowledge of plaintiffs injuries, plaintiff cannot 
dispense with notice requirement); Lando v. City of 
Chicago, 128 Ill.App.3d 597, 83 Ill.Dec. 752, 755, 
470 N.E.2d 1172, 1175 (1984) (where required 
notice was defective, actual notice supplied by third-
party (paramedics) did not satisfy statute). 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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future. Following those equivocal answers, follow-up I 
questions revealed that resolving the mother's 
problems would take a "significant amount of time," 
and that the father felt the children "deserve a lot 
more than I can give them right now." Then, 
Appellants both unequivocally agreed that 
relinquishment and adoption into a loving and stable 
environment was in the children's best interests. 
Given this testimony, the family's extensive history 
with the Division of Child and Family Services, and 
the nature of Appellants' personal problems, we 
conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that termination of parental 
rights was in the children's best interests. 
[^8 Appellants finally assert that they were denied 
effective assistance of counsel. JIn their briefs on 
appeal, Appellants' only argument oh this issue is a 
terse assertion, without citation to the record or any 
legal authority, that counsels' "superficial and cursory 
examination of [Appellants]" constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel because it prevented them from 
both expressing their true feelings and demonstrating 
"on record that [they] had an adequate, 
understanding" of the proceeding and its 
consequences. Rule 24(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires that all arguments 
contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on." Id Because Appellants have 
failed to cite to the record and any legal authority in , 
support of their ineffective assistance claim, we could 
properly refuse to consider it. See State v. Thomas, 
1999 UT 2,111, 974 R2d 269. 
^9 In any event, the argument fails on its merits. 
Appellants firsf raised their ineffective assistance 
claim in their post- judgment motion urider Rule 
60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 To 
establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
an appellant must show that "counsel's performance 
was objectively deficient and that counsels deficient 
performance prejudiced the case." In re Eft., 880 
P.2ci 11, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 'Appellants' only 
contention in their briefs on appeal is that counsels' 
examinations of Appellants during the relinquishment 
proceeding were inadequate. Even assuming that 
counsels' examinations were objectively deficient, 
Appellants were not 'prejudiced. The record 
establishes that the requirements of section 78-3 a-414 
were met. In addition, Appelldhts were gi^en an 
opportunity to ask questions at the hearing, and they 
were asked to explain in their own words why 
termination of parental rights and adoption was in the 
Children's best interests. Thus, the juvenile court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' Rule 
60(b) motion. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,19, 2 P.3d 451 
(establishing abuse of discretion as the proper 
standard of review for denial of Rule 60(b) motions). 
110 We affirm the juvenile court's orders 
terminating Appellants' parental rights and denying 
their post-judgment motions. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
111 WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
UTAH 
1. At oral argument, Appellants cited In re D.LS., 332 
N.W2d 293 (Wis. 1983). The court in In re D.LS., 
however, merely applied the Wisconsin statutory 
requirements for voluntary relinquishment of parental 
rights, which include an explicit right to a jury trial if 
requested by the relinquishing parent. See id at 296 n.5. In 
re D.LS. does not stand for the proposition that due process 
requires a court to comply with Rule 11 in voluntary 
relinquishment cases 
2. Although a conclusion on the best interest of the children 
is included in the juvenile court's findings of fact, such a 
determination is "more properly labeled a conclusion of 
law." In re SLA 999 UT App 390 at 130 n 6 
3. Rule 60(b)(6) is "sufficiently broad" to permit a court to 
set aside a judgment for ineffective assistance of counsel 
Stewart v Sullivan, 29 Utah 2d 156, 158, 506 P.2d 74, 76 
(1973) 
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BENCH, Judge: 
% 1 Appellant argues that the trial court erred whenit 
granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss after 
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case 
because of Appellant's failure to properly serve a 
notice of claim on the Utah Attorney General. We 
j affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
\2 On March 17, 1997, Appellant was struck by a 
vehicle operated by Appellee Haven B. Hendricks, an 
employee of Appellee Utah State University. 
\ Appellant prepared a complaint against Appellees for 
damages resulting from the accident Pursuant to t^e 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Appellant 
prepared two notices of claim to be served in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1997).l 
An employee of Appellant's attorney sent one notice 
of claim to Utah State University and called the 
fCB REPORTS 
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Dffice of the Utah Attorney General (Attorney 
jeneral) to inquire as to whom the other notice 
ihqjjfdfte sent. After being transferred, the employee 
;pdke to an unidentified person who allegedly told 
ler to send the notice to the Division of Risk 
Management The employee mailed a notice of claim 
to the Division of Risk Management on February 6, 
1998. 
|3 In January 1999, Appellant filed her complaint 
against Appellees in the First District Court. The 
Attprriey General subsequently filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, alleging that the bffice had not been 
properly served with a notice of "claim pursuant to 
section 63-30-12. The trial court held a hearing and 
granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant filed a 
motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. 
This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f4 The issue before us is whether the trial court 
properly dismissed Appellant's complaint after 
finding thatishe had not complied with the notice of 
claim requirements in section 63-30-12. '"The grant 
of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed 
under the same standard as the grant of a motion tp 
dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion 
only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not 
recover under the facts alleged."1 Siraley v. Haltiday, 
2000 UT App 38,^8,997 P.2d 33 8'(quoting Gdlding 
v.'Ashley Cent. Ir'rigattont CfcJ*793, P.2d 89*7, 898 (Utah 1990)). The grant ofimbtiQnto dismiss is thus 
a matter of law1, which "we review for correctness." 
Id. 
ANALYSIS 
%5 Appellant relies on Bischel v. Metritt, 907 P.2d 
l275 (Utah€t. App. 1995) to support her contention 
that she complied with the requirements for filing a 
notice of claim. Btowever, wrf conclude that the, 
circumstances in Bischel are easily distinguished from 
this case. In Bischel, we recognized the established 
rule of strict compliance with the notice provisions of 
tfie Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See id. at 279. 
We also acknowledged ambiguities in Utah Code 
Ann. §§63-30-11,-13 (1993) because they did not 
"prescribe a specific manner or method for filing 
notice with the governing body of the political 
subdivision." Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278. Specifically, 
we concluded that "direction and delivery of the 
notice must be inferred from the phrase, 'notice of 
claim is filed with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim arises.'" 
Id. (quoting Utah Code Anh. § 63-30-13 (1993)). 
Because the statute did not specify to whom Bischel 
was to direct her notice of claim, we concluded that 
she could rely on representations of an employee of 
the county attorney's office that she could direct her 
notice to that office. See id. In Bellonio v Salt Lake 
City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) we 
explained the effect of Bischel on the general rule 
requiring strict compliance with the Governmental 
Immunity Act. We pointed to the unique factual 
circumstances of Bischel andsaid our decision in that 
case should not be viewed as an" abrogation of] the 
long-standing rule requiring strict compliance withall 
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act." 
5e//omo,911P.2datl297. 
H6 In this case, Appellant's claim is against the State, 
rxnt tVui rmintv This case is therefore governed by 
in part: "A claim against the state.,. is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the attorney general ajxd 
the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises.n Id. (emphasis added). Section 63-30-12 does 
not contain the same ambiguities as to whom the 
notice of claim should be directed as sections 
63-30-11 and -13. An individual makings claim 
against the State need not infer which governmental 
entity should be served with notice—the statute gives 
explicit directions. Any confusion over who should 
receive the notice was created by Appellant when she 
elected to rely *on advice from an unnamed state 
employee; -rather than 'the plain language of the 
statute. 
\l Appellant would also have us conclude that the 
Division of Risk Management is an office of the 
Attorney General because an assistant attorney 
general maintains an office * there. However, in 
Siraley, we recognized that * while* notice *"to the 
Division of Risk Management may be "sufficient to 
comply with . . . [the] requirement that the notice of 
claim also be filed with the agency concerned,... it 
cannot suffice for the Immunity Act's requirement that 
notice be filed with the Attorney General** Straley, 
2000 UT App 38 atf 16 n.9 (internal citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
\% Finally, Appellant contends that this case falls 
within the exception to the general rule that 
"precludes the assertion of estoppel against the 
government." Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 
P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). The exception to this 
general rule, -however, applies only in cases where 
"the facts may be found with such certainty, and the 
injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to 
invoke the exception^" Id. The exception requires "a 
high standard of prdof' and has only applied in cases 
involving "very specific written representations by 
authorized government entities." Anderson v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992). No 
written representation was involved in this case, and 
Appellant cannot even name the state employee on 
whose advice she relied. Appellant does not allege, 
and we can find no indication of, willful misconduct 
on the government's part nor an intent to hinder 
Appellant's pursuit of her claim. Thus, we conclude 
that Appellant falls far short of meeting the high 
standard of proof required for us to apply estoppel in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
^9 Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to 
justify her reliance on the advice of an unnamed state 
employee rather than the plain language of section 
63-30-12. Appellant did not strictly comply with the 
notice requirements of section 63-30-12 because she 
failed to serve notice of her claim on the Attorney 
General within the specified time period. Therefore, 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Appellant's claim and we affirm the dismissal of her 
complaint. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
flO WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A, Thorne, Jr., Judge 
State v. One 1980 Cadillac 
417 Utah AdV. Rep. 6 
Code-C 
Provo, Uta 
1. At the time Appellant's claim arose, section 63-30-12 
required that notice be served on "the attorney general and 
the agency concerned." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1997). 
Subsequently, section 63-30-12 has been revised to require 
that a notice of claim be served only on the Attorney 
General. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (Supp. 2000). 
Cite as 
417 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
ONE 1980 CADILLAC and Three Thousand, Six 
Hundred, Seventy Six Dollars U.S. Currency, 
Defendant, 
Rick Dee Keebler, 
Appellant. 
No. 990382 
FILED: 03/16/01 
2001 UT 26 
Sixth District, Sevier County 
The Honorable David L. Mower 
ATTORNEYS: 
R. Don Brown, Richfield, for plaintiff 
Rick Dee Keebler, Leavenworth, Kansas, pro se 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
K1 Appellant Rick Dee Keebler ("Keebler") appeals 
pro se from the trial court's judgment, pursuant to the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13(1998), ordering forfeiture of his 1980 
Cadillac and $3676 in United States currency to the 
State of Utah. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
\2 On September 20, 1994, while driving a 1980 
Cadillac in Sevier County, Utah, Keebler was stopped 
by the Utah Highway Patrol for a traffic offense. A 
search of the vehicle revealed that Keebler was 
transporting large quantities of controlled substances, 
including methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and 
marijuana. The officer arrested Keebler and seized the 
1980 Cadillac and $3676 cash found in Keebler's 
possession. Keebler was subsequently charged and 
convicted under federal drug charges. Throughout 
this litigation, he has been incarcerated and continues 
to serve as an inmate in federal prison. 
f 3 On September 30, 1994, the State of Utah filed a 
complaint and notice of seizure and forfeiture in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in Sevier County. In the 
complaint, the state alleged that the 1980 Cadillac and 
the $3676 were being used or intended for use to 
facilitate the transportation, receipt, possession, 
and/or concealment of illegal narcotics in violation of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act. Therefore, the 
state urged forfeiture of Keebler's property. Keebler 
answered the complaint and denied the state's 
allegations. 
[^4 No further action was taken in this matter unti 
May 27, 1998, when the state moved for summan 
judgment. After Keebler opposed the motion, the tria 
court denied summary judgment because the use o 
the seized currency was in dispute. Subsequently 
while still incarcerated, Keebler moved for fina 
disposition of the matter. 
f5 A scheduling conference was held on Decembe 
8,1998, at which Keebler appeared via telephone. A 
that time, the court scheduled a bench trial for Marcl 
23,1999. About one month before the scheduled tria 
date, Keebler petitioned the trial court for an orde 
requiring the State of Utah to bear the cost o 
transporting him to appear and testify at the trial 
However, the trial court did not act on the motion anc 
the bench trial was held as scheduled. Keebler, stil 
incarcerated, was not present or represented at th< 
trial. 
f 6 After trial, the court made findings of fact that a 
the time of Keebler's arrest, he possessed and wai 
transporting large quantities of narcotics for illega 
d i s t r ibu t ion , inc lud ing 8 pounds o 
methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 5 ounces o 
heroin, and 11.5 pounds of marijuana. The trial cour 
found that Keebler actually admitted his intent tc 
break the narcotics down into small quantities and sel 
them illegally for an anticipated return of $175,000 
In addition, the trial court found that Keeblei 
admitted he had previously purchased and distributee 
for profit other illegal narcotics, including 2 poundi 
of methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of cocaine, 2 ounce* 
of heroin, and 6 pounds of marijuana. Based on these 
findings of fact, the court concluded that the 198( 
Cadillac was being used to transport narcotics anc 
that the currency constituted proceeds of narcotic! 
distribution in violation of the Utah Controllec 
Substances Act. The trial court ordered that the 198( 
Cadillac and the $3676 be forfeited to the state. 
1[7 On appeal, Keebler raises three claims of error 
He argues that (1) the trial court's judgmen 
constitutes double jeopardy because Keebler1! 
conviction on federal drug charges is based on th( 
same conduct relevant to the forfeiture proceeding 
(2) the trial court's judgment violates Keebler's righ 
to due process of law because the state did not beai 
the cost of transporting him to Utah to appear at th< 
trial and did not appoint counsel to represent him, anc 
(3) the trial court did not have subject mattei 
jurisdiction in the forfeiture proceeding because 
Keebler was convicted under federal jurisdiction anc 
was not charged under the Utah Controllec 
Substances Act. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
TJ8 The trial court's judgment contained no express 
conclusions of law with regard to Keebler's claims o 
error. However, the inference _ inherent in the 
judgment is that the trial court found no merit tc 
Keebler's constitutional and jurisdictional arguments 
Keebler's constitutional arguments regarding double 
jeopardy and due process present questions ofjaw 
State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five ThousandJEigh 
Hundred Dollars, United States Currency, and One 
Scale, 942 P.2d 343,346 (Utah 1997) (citing Ryan v 
Gold Cross Servs, Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utaf 
1995)). Subject matter jurisdiction is also a questior 
of law. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917,91S 
(Utah 1993) (citing Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2c 
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